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Researchers have found that an individual’s risk attitude is not stable across elicitation methods. Results
reported by Deck et al. (2009) suggest that personality may help explain the apparent inconsistency,
offering support to Borghans et al.’s (2008) argument that economists should consider a multi‐domain
approach to measuring risk attitudes. This paper uses laboratory methods to compare risk attitudes as
measured by the Holt and Laury (2002) procedure under two different frames. We find that, as in Deck
et al. (2009), one’s willingness to take financial risks (as measured by Weber et al. 2002) significantly
affects behavior; however the effect is significantly greater when the task is framed as a financial
decision. This paper also asks whether personality can explain the well documented behavioral
difference between first price and Dutch auctions. While one’s gambling attitude (as measured by
Weber et al. 2002) affects bidding behavior, it does not do so differentially between auction formats.

Keywords: Risk Attitudes, Personality, Auctions, Framing Effects, Laboratory Experiments
JEL Codes: C9, D4, D8

The experiments reported in this paper were conducted while Deck was a visiting researcher at the Economic Science

Institute (ESI) at Chapman University. The authors wish to thank the ESI for financial and technical support. This
research was also supported in part by NIH grant R21AG030184.
A

University of Arkansas, Department of Economics. WCOB 402, Fayetteville AR 72701. Phone No. (479) 575‐3266. Email:
cdeck@walton.uark.edu, jreyes@walton.uark.edu

B

Florida International University, Department of Economics, Miami Fl 33199. Phone No. (305) 348 6639. Email: leej@fiu.edu

1. Introduction
In virtually every situation, a decision maker faces uncertainty. Therefore, understanding how people
make choices under uncertainty is critical to economic science. The standard economic approach has
been to assume a given structural form (e.g. CARA and CRRA) for one’s risk attitude and then estimate
model parameters to make predicted behavior match observed behavior. To this end, scholars have
used data from a wide variety of sources to measure risk attitudes: realized stock market returns
(Mehra and Prescott 1985), large scale surveys like the NLSY and HRS (Barsky et al., 1997) and television
game shows like Deal or No Deal (Baltussen et al. 2008 and Deck et al. 2008).
Controlled laboratory experiments offer another source of data on decision making under uncertainty
and have been used to measure risk aversion in a variety of ways. One technique receiving considerable
attention is the procedure of Holt and Laury (2002), hereafter H&L, in which subjects are given a series
of binary choices over lotteries. An alternative approach is to infer risk attitudes from behavior in
auctions (see for example Isaac and James 2000). Frustratingly, there is little consistency between
elicitation techniques. Schoemaker (1990), Isaac and James (2000) and Berg et al. (2005) all report
inconsistent risk taking behavior between elicitation techniques.
In part the behavioral inconsistency is driven by an assumption that the same mathematical form and
the same parameter values should hold for each situation a person faces. In contrast, Borghans et al.
(2008), following developments in the psychology literature, argue that economists should consider a
multi‐domain model of risk taking behavior. This is the type of approach taken by Weber et al. (2002),
which claims that people view risk over six domains, not one. According to Weber et al. (2002) people
distinguish between financial, gambling, social, ethical, recreational, and health safety risks.
Furthermore, they claim people view risks within each domain similarly, but may have distinct risk
tolerances in different domains. For example, a person willing to engage in extreme sports like hang
gliding may not be willing to invest their retirement savings in high risk speculative stocks.
There is some experimental economics support for the Weber et al. (2002) domains. Deck et al. (2009)
conducted two sets of experiments on the same subjects. One was a laboratory version of the game
show Deal or No Deal and the other was a variation of the H&L procedure. The researchers report that
behavior was not consistent between the two tasks, and that this variation could be explained in part by
the subject’s propensities to take risk in the domains identified by Weber et al. (2002). Specifically, Deck
et al. (2009) find that risk taking behavior in Deal or No Deal was associated with a willingness to take
gambling risks, while risk taking in the H&L procedure was associated with a willingness to take financial
risks.
The purpose of this paper is two‐fold. First, we want to directly test the multi‐domain approach. If
people possess multi‐domain risk attitudes, then we should be able to frame the same choice in two
different ways so that the perceived domains differ causing behavior to change accordingly. Our results
indicated that we can. To do this, we present subjects with two versions of a modified H&L task: one
framed as gambling and the other framed as investing. The tasks are numerically identical, but differ in
language and presentation. Our finding that one’s personality can help explain behavioral differences
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across elicitation techniques further calls into question the appropriateness of attempts to model risk as
simply depending upon payoffs and probabilities (as in CARA and CRRA). The second goal of this paper
is to determine if a multi‐domain approach can explain the well known behavioral result that people bid
as though they are more risk averse in a first price auction than in a Dutch auction with private
independent values, even though the two institutions are theoretically isomorphic. We explore this
question with a separate set of experiments. While we do find evidence that personality affects bidding
in both institutions, it does not appear to do so differentially.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section details the design of the first
experiment focusing on framing the H&L procedure and the third section describes the formal
hypotheses and the experimental results. The fourth section provides the design of the second set of
(exploratory) experiments focusing on behavior in auctions and the fifth section describes the results. A
final section provides concluding remarks.
2. Experimental Design: Framing the Holt and Laury (2002) Task
In the H&L task, a person has to make series of choices over two lotteries. In the versions we use, the
safe lottery prizes are always $8.00 and $10.00 while in the risky lottery the prizes are always $0.50 and
$19.25. The amounts are five times those of the baseline in the original H&L study. The series of
choices are typically presented in a table so that the chance of receiving the higher payoff amount,
which is the same in both lotteries, is increasing as the subject moves down the table. In the first row,
the subject is assured of receiving the lowest prize. In the second row the subject has a 10% chance of
receiving the larger amount and in each subsequent row the chance of receiving the larger amount
increases by an additional 10%. With this construction, a subject should select the safe lottery up to a
point and then switch to choosing the risky lottery, although it is not uncommon for some subjects to
switch back and forth.
Figure 1 shows the two framings of the H&L procedure: gambling task (top panel) and financial task
(bottom panel). In the gambling task, the subjects must “place a bet” by putting a gambling chip on a
betting circle. The background, use of playing card images, and the (flashing) symbols at the bottom of
the screen were meant to emulate a casino. In the financial task, the subjects had to choose between
two investment opportunities by selecting as asset. The (moving) ticker symbols at the bottom of the
screen were meant to emulate a financial trading environment.
Each subject completed three tasks during the experiment: the gambling task, the financial task, and a
survey. The survey included the complete Domain‐Specific Risk‐Taking (DOSPERT) scale of Weber et al.
(2002), which consists of a series of questions with 5 point Likert responses from 1 = Highly Unlikely to 5
= Highly Likely about the subjects’ likelihood of engaging in certain activities. A willingness to take
gambling risks is measured via statements such as “Betting a day’s income at a high stakes poker game.”
The financial domain is measured by statements such as “Investing 5% of your annual income in a very
speculative stock.” In both cases the personality score was a simple average of the responses for the
associated questions. Demographic information such as gender and year of birth were also included on
the survey.
2

Figure 1. Framed Risk Attitude Elicitation Tasks

Gambling Task

Financial Task
Upon entering the lab, a subject drew a slip of paper with a printed code number. This practice ensured
privacy and served to randomize the order in which the subjects observed the gambling and financial
tasks.1 Subjects then read written directions for one of the H&L styled tasks and answered a brief quiz.
1

The included health risk questions were potentially sensitive, as they asked about unprotected sex and illegal
drug use. Even numbered codes completed the gambling task first, while odd numbered codes completed the
financial task first.
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Once the experimenter had checked the subject’s responses for correctness, the subject was allowed to
make her decisions for the first task. Consistent with previous studies and in order to control wealth
effects, one of the choices was randomly selected to determine the subject’s payoff for the first task.
The survey was always the second task to create a minimal separation between the two mathematically
identical H&L style tasks, potentially biasing our results away from finding a framing difference. After
completing the survey, the subject received the directions for the final task, which was completed only
after the subjects had correctly answered the accompanying quiz. The directions for the gambling and
financial tasks were as similar as possible and the numerical answers to the quizzes were identical.
Copies of the directions and the surveys are available upon request.
A total of 50 subjects, drawn from the undergraduate student population at Chapman University,
participated in the experiment. While some of the subjects had participated in unrelated economics
experiments, none had participated in any related studies. The average salient payment was
approximately $11.00 and subjects also received a $7 participation payment. The experiment lasted
approximately 30 minutes and although the tasks were individualized, multiple people were in the lab at
the same time. Each subject was seated at a desk that was visually isolated by privacy dividers. Once a
subject completed the experiment, she privately flipped a coin to determine which task would be used
for her payment. She then received her cash payment and was dismissed from the experiment. The
coin flip procedure was designed to control wealth effect and was known to the subjects at the start of
the experiment, although they did not know what the specific tasks would be.
3. Experimental Results: Framing the Holt and Laury (2002) Task
This study is not concerned with finding a specific functional form for risk aversion, but rather with
comparing observed behavior between framings. Following H&L and Baker et al. (2007), we use the
number of safe choices as our measure of risk tolerance in the H&L tasks. Let #SG and #SF denote the
number of safe choices a subject makes in the gambling and financial tasks, respectively. Further, let
FDom and GDom denote a subject’s score on the financial and gambling portions of the DOSPERT
scales2. We assume that #SG and #SF are functions of FDom, GDom, and other characteristics such as
age and gender.
The basis for each of our first two hypotheses is based upon Deck et al. (2009), which found that one’s
score on the financial portion of the DOSPERT was negatively correlated with how much risk one would
tolerate in a neutrally framed H&L task. Therefore, we expect that a higher FDom score will lead to a
smaller number of safe choices in both H&L tasks. While we expect one’s financial score on the
DOSPERT to matter in both tasks, we expect it to have a greater effect when the task is framed as a
financial choice. This is the main hypothesis tested by the experiment.
Although previous research did not find a significant relationship between one’s gambling attitude and
behavior in the H&L task, it is still reasonable to expect that an increase in one’s willingness to accept
gambling risks will weakly decrease the number of safe choices. That is, we expect that a higher GDom
2

A higher FDom or GDom score indicates a greater willingness to take risks in the financial or gambling domain,
respectively.
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score will lead to a smaller number of safe choices in both H&L tasks. Further, we expect that one’s
willingness to take gambling risks would have a (weakly) greater effect in the gambling frame.
To test the null hypotheses of no risk domain effects, we rely upon the OLS estimations reported in
Table 1. GFirst = 1 if the subjects completed the gambling task first and is 0 otherwise. Estimation (1)
has #SF as the dependent variable while estimation (2) has #SG as the dependent variable. The
dependent variable for estimation (3) is #SF ‐ #SG. From (1) and (2) one can reject the null hypothesis
that FDom does not affect the number of safe choices for both frames, respectively. This result is
consistent with Deck et al. (2009), as is the lack of significance for GDom in (1) and (2).
Table 1. Estimation Results for Number of Safe Choices in Holt and Laury (2002) Tasks.
Dependent
Variable
Constant
FDom
GDom
Age
Male
GFirst

(1)
#SF
Coefficient
5.456*
‐0.803***
0.232
0.177
‐0.043
‐0.158

p‐value
0.073
0.009
0.539
0.210
0.928
0.726

(2)
#SG
Coefficient
p‐value
3.649
0.246
‐0.446*
0.095
0.313
0.403
0.198
0.195
‐0.333
0.437
‐0.353
0.403

(3)
#SF ‐ #SG
Coefficient
p‐value
1.807
0.277
‐0.357*
0.096
‐0.080
0.806
‐0.020
0.336
0.290
0.526
0.195
0.277

*, **, and *** indicate significant difference from 0 at the 10, 5, and 1 percent significance levels. p‐values are calculated using
White heteroskedasticity corrected standard errors.

We now turn to our main question of interest: can we manipulate behavior in a direction predicted by
the subject’s personality? The answer, from (3), is yes. Specifically, the negative coefficient on FDom in
(3), although being marginally significant, indicates the null hypothesis of no effect can be rejected in
favor of the alternative that one’s propensity to take financial risks has more influence in the gambling
frame. It is worth recalling that this effect is present even though the tasks are extremely similar and
only separated by a few minutes. One’s gambling attitude does not have a differential effect in either
framing. Finally, we note that there is no significant age or gender effect for either framing, nor does
the ordering of the tasks have a significant effect in any of the three specifications.
4. Experimental Design: Comparing Dutch and First Price Sealed Bid Auctions
One of the most puzzling and persistent experimental findings in economics is the lack of a behavioral
isomorphism between the first sealed price and Dutch clock auctions with independent private values.
In the first price auction, each bidder privately submits a bid and the highest bidder is awarded the item
at a price equal to her bid. The other bidders earn nothing. In the Dutch auction, the selling price is
initially set above the (anticipated) values of the bidders. The price is then decreased incrementally until
some bidder stops the price and agrees to purchase at the current price. Again, other bidders receive
nothing. Theoretically, these two auction formats should generate the same price and bidders should
employ the same strategy (bid as a function of value) even allowing for non‐risk neutral bidders.
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However, in the laboratory this result does not hold; subjects appear more risk averse in the first price
auction (see Cox et al., 1982, Turocy, Watson, and Battalio 2007, and Deck and Wilson, 2008).
We propose an alternative explanation for the lack of a behavioral isomorphism between first price and
Dutch auctions, namely that the institutions are perceived as belonging to different risk domains. Deck
et al. (2009) reported that behavior in Deal or No Deal was drawn from the gambling domain. Like a
Dutch auction, the Deal or No Deal game has a sequential process where excitement builds as the game
progresses. By contrast, a first price auction is a static comparison of lotteries, like the H&L task which
draws upon one’s financial outlook. Therefore we expect that one’s gambling attitude will have a
greater effect on behavior in the Dutch auction than in the first price auction and that one’s financial
attitude will have a greater impact in the first price auction. It also seems reasonable to expect that a
greater willingness to take financial or gambling risks will lead to weakly more risk loving behavior in
both auction formats.
To test our hypotheses, we conducted a series of auction experiments. As in the H&L experiments
discussed above, each subject in this experiment completed three tasks (Dutch auctions, first price
auctions, and the survey). The survey, which was always administered as the second task, was identical
to the one described above. Subjects were again given codes to protect their privacy; however, this
code did not affect the ordering of the two auction tasks because subjects were bidding against other
subjects in the lab during the auctions. Half of the subjects completed the Dutch auctions first while the
other half completed the first price auctions first.
The implementation of the auction experiments differed from H&L experiment in several ways, in part
due to the multi‐person nature of the experiment and in part to be consistent with previous auction
experiments. The computerized directions were read aloud to ensure that everyone in the lab was
receiving the same information. This necessitated that only a single ordering be run in each session. To
ensure that subjects did not know who they were bidding against, there were multiple concurrent
auctions. As is standard in auctions experiments, subjects completed a series of auctions with fixed
matching (i.e. bidding against the same people in each auction) and were paid their cumulative earnings.
As described by Cox et al. (1982), one must be careful in setting up the institutions so as not to introduce
asymmetry. The following values were selected for our auctions: n = 3 bidders, values drawn from
U∼[0,240] in increments of 15, bids and Dutch prices ∈ [0,10,20,…,240], clock speed = 1 second. The
auction winner received her value minus bid (sealed or clock) in cents thus inducing the values and
making the decisions salient. Under the assumption of risk neutrality in each auction a bidder should bid
0.75 × value, the expected price is 120, and the expected profit per bidder was 20. The bid and value
increments are set so that bidders could follow the risk neutral Nash equilibrium strategy. Our subjects
completed 30 first price auctions and 90 Dutch auctions. The distribution of values is similar to that
used in Smith and Dickhaut (2005), who also run a total of 120 auctions.3 In the Dutch auction, only the
winner actually bids, meaning that no information is collected on the other n ‐ 1 bidders. The number of

3

Their auctions involve four bidders with values drawn from U∼[0,250] so the expected profit per bidder is greater
in our experiments.
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bidders is small to reduce this information loss. This is also the reason we ran three times as many
Dutch auctions; we expect to observe thirty bids in each institution for each subject.4 Finally, the clock
speed for the Dutch auction is an important design variable. Katok and Kwasnica (2008) report that
faster clocks generate lower prices. They argue that slower clock speeds impose greater monitoring and
opportunity costs on bidders and suggest this may explain why Lucking‐Reiley (1999) failed to replicate
the laboratory auction price ordering results in field experiments conducted via online auctions. An
alternative explanation consistent with our hypothesis is that slower clocks are boring and thus not
perceived as gambling. Our clock speed, which falls by 4.2% of the maximum value per second, is similar
to the (exciting) fast speed of a 5% drop per second of Katok and Kwasnica (2008).
A total of 42 new subjects participated in these experiments; 21 in each auction ordering. The subjects
were drawn from the undergraduate population at Chapman University and none had participated in
any related experiments including the H&L experiments described above. The experiments lasted
approximately 90 minutes and the average salient earnings were approximately $13. Subjects also
received a $7 participation payment.
5. Experimental Results Design: Comparing Auctions
As in section 3, we are not concerned with any specific functional form of risk aversion. Therefore we
use the simple measure of bid/value as the dependent variable.5 A more risk averse subject would bid a
larger fraction of her value while a less risk averse bidder would seek a greater profit by lowering her
bid. Table 2 gives the relevant estimation results based upon useable observations from 40 subjects.
The dependent variable is the subject’s average bid/value in the first price auction (1) and the Dutch
auction (2).6 Estimation (3) is our primary interest as its dependent variable is average bid/value in the
first price auction minus average bid/value in the Dutch auction. DFirst is a dummy variable for a subject
having gone through the Dutch auction first. Other variables are as before.
Based upon the estimated coefficients in (1) and (2), one’s attitude towards gambling (GDom) has a
significant impact on bidding behavior in both the first price and Dutch auctions. In both cases, a
greater willingness to gamble is associated with more risk loving bidding, consistent with our
expectations. However, the GDom variable is not significant in (3) indicting that one’s attitude towards
4

The actual number of observations in the Dutch auction varied depending on realized values and the behavior of
other bidders.
5
An issue with measuring risk aversion in Dutch auctions is that losing bids are not observed. Thus, if bids are not
linear, as in the case of CRRA when risk parameters are assumed to be drawn from a known distribution, then the
resulting implied bid function or risk attitude is biased. In our analysis, we are constructing a single observation for
each subjects and then comparing this measurement across subjects, thereby avoiding this issue. Turocy, Watson,
and Battalio (2007) considered a hybrid auction where the Dutch clock ran until bids were observed from all
participants, but the authors report that this institutional change led to different behavior than the standard Dutch
auction.
6
One subject did not fully complete the survey and another subject went bankrupt in the Dutch auction. Once a
subject goes bankrupt, the experimenter has effectively lost control over the subject’s incentives as losses cannot
be imposed due to institutional constraints. If the subject will receive $0 if she has experimental losses of $5 or
$5000, then her incentive is to take long shot gambles regardless of risk attitude as losses or small gains do not
affect her real payoff.
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gambling does not have a differential effect in the two auction formats. An increase in one’s willingness
to accept financial risks does not significantly lower one’s bid in either auction format as shown in
estimations (1) and (2), nor does it explain any behavioral difference between auctions as shown in (3).
Together these results indicate that one’s risk domain personality does affect bidding behavior in the
auctions, but cannot explain behavioral differences between them.
Table 2. Estimation Average Bid/Value in Auctions.
Dependent
Variable

Constant
FDom
GDom
Age
Male
DFirst

(1)
Avg (Bid/Value) in First
Coefficient
0.664***
0.019
‐0.036**
0.006*
0.004
0.044*

p‐value
<0.001
0.239
0.015
0.051
0.858
0.074

(2)
Avg (Bid/Value) in Dutch
Coefficient
0.759***
0.004
‐0.049***
0.007**
‐0.006
‐0.026**

p‐value
<0.001
0.842
0.007
0.032
0.821
0.322

(3)
Avg (Bid/Value) in First ‐
Avg (Bid/Value) in Dutch
Coefficient
p‐value
‐0.095
0.309
0.015
0.384
0.013
0.580
‐0.002
0.647
0.010
0.754
0.070*
0.059

*, **, and *** indicate significant difference from 0 at the 10, 5, and 1 percent significance levels. P‐values are calculated using
White heteroskedasticity corrected standard errors.

The other coefficient estimations reported in Table 2 reveal interesting patterns as well. First, age has
equal and significant explanatory power in both auctions. Older subjects behave in a more risk averse
manner in both the Dutch and First price auctions. Evidence that the age effect is equal is given by the
lack of significance on age in (3). Second, we find no evidence of a gender effect in either auction as
evidence by the lack of significance on male in all three estimations. Finally, there is clear evidence of an
ordering effect. Those subjects who experienced the Dutch auction first were relatively more risk averse
in the first price auction and relatively less risk averse in the Dutch auction as evidenced by the
coefficients on DFirst. This suggests that subjects are relatively more risk averse in their second auction
format, regardless of format. From (3) the difference in behavior between auctions is larger when
subjects experience the Dutch auction first.
6. Conclusions
The standard economic model assumes that people walk around with hard and fast choice rules
regarding decision making under uncertainty. While such an assumption provides mathematical
tractability, this paper offers further evidence that its usefulness for understanding economic behavior
may be limited. Specifically, this paper reports experimental results suggesting personality impacts
behavior.
In the first set of experiments presented in this paper, we find that behavior in an H&L “gambling” task
differs from behavior in an H&L “financial” task where the only difference between the two is the
presentation. Further, we find this within subject difference can be partially explained by the subject’s
personality; a subject’s willingness to take financial risks affects her behavior in both frames, but it has a
8

greater impact on behavior in the financial task. This result is evidence that people do view risk in
different domains and that “[a] deeper understanding of personality traits promises to enrich economic
theory and to understand the sources of, and solutions for, human inequality” (Borghans et al., 2008,
p.85).
In our second set of experiments we find that gambling propensity affects behavior in both first price
sealed bid and Dutch clock auctions with independent private values. This result, together with our
finding that H&L behavior is related to financial risk taking attitude but not gambling, affirms the
conclusion of Deck et al. (2009) that different elicitation methods may generate seemingly inconsistent
behavior because they appeal to different aspects of personality. This may help explain the (seemingly)
inconsistent results of previous studies including Schoemaker (1990), Isaac and James (2000) and Berg et
al. (2005).
The implications of our findings are potentially quite broad, extending beyond measuring risk aversion in
the lab. For example, how researchers should model retirement savings and medical insurance
decisions may be different. Allowing for a multi‐domain approach to economic decision making could
help explain why individuals often appear to have altruistic or other regarding preferences in dictator
and other strategic interactions but not in market experiments (see, e.g., Plott and Smith 2008). We are
not arguing that Weber et al. (2002) have or have not identified a complete and correct set of domain,
nor are we claiming a multi‐domain approach is sufficient for modeling behavior. However, we do
believe that there is sufficient evidence that a multi‐domain approach has merit and should be
investigated further with more challenging and stringent experiments that ultimately yield
improvements for theoretical modeling.
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